The Linux server and SSH playbook for the first 72 hours
- 0 to 4 hours: 3 steps
- 4 to 24 hours: 2 steps
- 24 to 72 hours: 4 steps
- Hours elapsed: the bar under the cells
Checklist to print
0 to 4 hours3 steps, due by hour 4
- 1
Security lead, hand-off
Decide which hosts are in scope with one script, run as root on every host that runs sshd: b=$(command -v sshd); ldd "$b" 2>&1 | grep -q musl && echo musl=yes || echo musl=no; ldd "$b" 2>&1 | grep -qi pam && echo pam=linked || echo pam=none; sshd -T | grep -iE '^(passwordauthentication|usepam|permitrootlogin)'; echo starred: $(awk -F: '$2=="*"{print $1}' /etc/shadow); echo hashed: $(awk -F: '$2 ~ /^\$[56]\$/{print $1}' /etc/shadow). A host is in scope when musl=yes, pam=none (or usepam no), passwordauthentication yes, and both account lists are non-empty. That is five of the six conditions; the sixth, a reachable port 22, is cut in step 3. Hosts with glibc are out of scope for this flaw. Also list embedded images from vendors, since Medcrypt reproduced the bypass on a stock Yocto image.
Done at
- 2
Platform engineering, hand-off
On each in-scope host that cannot be patched in the hour, turn password login off. First test key login in a second session and keep your first session open. Alpine's commands are: mkdir -p /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d; echo 'PasswordAuthentication no' > /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-no-passwords.conf; sed -i.bak -e '1i PasswordAuthentication no' -e 's/^\(\s*PasswordAuthentication[^y#]*\)yes/\1no/i' /etc/ssh/sshd_config; sshd -t && rc-service sshd restart; sshd -T | grep -i passwordauthentication. The last command must print passwordauthentication no. The drop-in file is read from Alpine 3.19 onward; the sed line covers older releases and Match blocks. To undo, delete the drop-in and copy sshd_config.bak back.
Done at
- 3
Platform engineering, hand-off
Cut port 22 to the bastion or VPN range. On AWS list the groups that open it to everyone with aws ec2 describe-security-groups --filters Name=ip-permission.from-port,Values=22 Name=ip-permission.cidr,Values=0.0.0.0/0 --query 'SecurityGroups[].[GroupId,GroupName]' --output text, then replace 0.0.0.0/0 with your bastion range. A rule that opens a range containing 22 needs a second query. On the host, ss -ltnp | grep sshd shows what listens. Do this for in-scope hosts first, then for all.
Done at
- 1
4 to 24 hours2 steps, due by hour 24
- 4
Platform engineering, hand-off
Patch. On Alpine run apk upgrade -U -a then rc-service sshd restart, and read the result with apk info -v openssh-server. Fixed package versions: edge 10.6_p2-r0; 3.24 10.3_p1-r2; 3.23 10.2_p1-r1; 3.22 10.0_p1-r11; 3.21 9.9_p2-r1; 3.20 9.7_p1-r6; 3.19 9.6_p1-r3; 3.18 9.3_p2-r4; 3.17 9.1_p1-r7; 3.16 9.0_p1-r6. Point releases 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8 and 3.24.4 contain them; 3.16 to 3.20 have the packages but no new point release. Compare the package version, not the ssh -V banner, because Alpine's stable branches carry the fix under the old OpenSSH version. For OpenWrt, Buildroot and Yocto images, build OpenSSH 10.6p2 or apply commit 4353fdc43ef646c43a8dda7025cc1a898caf1482, which Medcrypt reports applies cleanly to OpenSSH 7.3p1 and later. Confirm the restart with ps -o pid,lstart,args -C sshd and compare the start time with the upgrade.
Done at
- 5
Security lead, hand-off
Look for logins that already happened on in-scope hosts. A starred account should only log in by key, so any password login for one is the bypass: for u in $(awk -F: '$2=="*"{print $1}' /etc/shadow); do grep "Accepted password for $u " /var/log/messages; done. Then look for GreyNoise's published traces: ls -l /etc/init.d/tac-agent /run/tac-agent.pid /root/.config/tac/agent.json.lock /tmp/py3.tar.gz; ls -d /opt/py3; grep -n vpnla /etc/hosts; sha256sum /etc/init.d/tac-agent against 7cf69bd6573a90d7bd287810b5c3746841cee6a7f77cadd016f34a97fc7b2361. Search logs for the addresses GreyNoise names, written here with dots in brackets: 183[.]220[.]91[.]15, 79[.]116[.]138[.]30, 20[.]255[.]63[.]133, 20[.]2[.]81[.]241, 209[.]248[.]50[.]17, 47[.]80[.]65[.]43, and 140[.]245[.]33[.]114 and 91[.]149[.]254[.]143 for a second cluster. Some may be compromised legitimate hosts. Review doas use, new users and authorized_keys. Alpine's rule: "If you cannot rule out a login, treat the machine as compromised."
Done at
- 4
24 to 72 hours4 steps, due by hour 72
- 6
Platform engineering, hand-off
Rebuild images in the order given in step 6 of the [container base image playbook](/playbooks/container-base-image/); check an image with docker run --rm --entrypoint apk IMAGE info -v openssh-server and compare with the fixed list in step 4. For Alpine tiny-cloud images (qcow2, VHD and AMI) from 3.18.11 through 3.24.3, the alpine user has a * password and passwordless doas. They are safe on first boot and become exploitable as soon as any $6$ hash exists, for example when an administrator sets a console password or user-data adds a user with hashed_passwd. Images from 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8, 3.24.4 and later carry the fix; for older images update openssh on every running instance.
Done at
- 7
Security lead, hand-off
Find the kernel exposure on all Linux servers, glibc ones included. Read the installed fix with rpm -q --changelog kernel | grep -E 'CVE-2026-(46300|53266)' on RPM systems and apt changelog linux-image-$(uname -r) | grep -E 'CVE-2026-(46300|53266)' on Debian and Ubuntu, because distributions backport the fix. Exposure: lsmod | grep -E 'esp4|esp6' for CVE-2026-46300, ebtables -t nat -L for a rule with -j snat and --snat-arp for CVE-2026-53266, and sysctl user.max_user_namespaces. Kernel floors that cover both flaws: RHEL 8 kernel-4.18.0-553.143.1.el8_10; RHEL 9 kernel-5.14.0-687.23.1.el9_8; RHEL 10 kernel-6.12.0-211.59.1.el10_2; Debian bullseye 5.10.259-1, bookworm 6.1.176-1, trixie 6.12.94-1; Ubuntu jammy 5.15.0-198.208, noble 6.8.0-146.146, resolute 7.0.0-31.31. Ubuntu focal 5.4.0-233.253 covers only CVE-2026-46300 and has no fix for CVE-2026-53266 yet, and Linux 5.4 is end-of-life. If you can reach a later kernel in the same reboot, CVE-2026-80521 (not in KEV; it affects RHEL 10, Debian bookworm and trixie, and Ubuntu noble, resolute and jammy HWE 6.8) needs RHEL 10 kernel-6.12.0-211.65.1.el10_2, Debian bookworm 6.1.190-1, trixie 6.12.111-1, Ubuntu noble 6.8.0-149.149, jammy HWE 6.8.0-149.149~22.04.1 and resolute 7.0.0-42.42.
Done at
- 8
Platform engineering, hand-off
Install the kernel and reboot, one node of each pair at a time. Check pending reboots with needs-restarting -r on RHEL and ls /var/run/reboot-required on Debian and Ubuntu, and compare uname -r with the newest installed kernel. Red Hat also ships kpatch updates for RHEL 8, 9 and 10 that avoid the reboot. Order: servers that run third-party code or give shell access first (shared shells, CI runners, hosts with web applications), then the rest.
Done at
- 9
Security lead, hand-off
Rescan with an authenticated scan and close with a list of exceptions. For each exception write the host, the owner, the date it will reach the fixed package or kernel, and the mitigation in place. The KEV due date for CVE-2026-123158 was 12 Nov 2026, 3 days after it was listed on 9 Nov; the two kernel flaws had due dates 3 days after listing too.
Done at
- 6
CVE-2026-123158 is a login bypass in sshd, and it is narrow. It needs six conditions at once: sshd built against musl libc, no PAM, password authentication on, an account whose password field is *, another account with a SHA-256 or SHA-512 hash, and a reachable SSH port. An attacker sends a password of 257 to 1024 bytes for the starred account. musl's crypt() returns * when it fails, the stored field is also *, the two match, and the login succeeds. Debian, Ubuntu and Red Hat use glibc and PAM and are not affected. The hosts that are affected are Alpine, and the embedded images built the same way with OpenWrt, Buildroot or Yocto.
What makes Linux servers different from the other playbooks is that the work splits in two. The SSH flaw is fixed by a package upgrade and a restart of sshd, and the upgrade alone does not replace the running daemon. The kernel flaws that CISA also lists for Linux are local privilege escalations that are fixed only by a new kernel and a reboot, and the distribution fix often shipped months before CISA listed the flaw. A shell gained through sshd and a local root flaw in the kernel are different bugs; no source reports them used together, but on one host the first hands an attacker a user and the second hands them root, so this page checks both.
When no fix exists yet
For the SSH flaw the fix exists, so the question is images that cannot take 10.6p2 or hosts that cannot restart sshd. Turn off password login: OpenSSH's own wording for musl systems without PAM is to set PasswordAuthentication=no or disable SSH immediately. The cost of the first is that nobody can log in with a password, so keep console or key access ready; the cost of the second is all remote administration of that host. Medcrypt, a third party, reports that MaxAuthTries 1 blocks its reproduction and MaxAuthTries 2 does not; treat it as a stopgap, because a user who mistypes a password once is disconnected. Reading the preconditions, you can also make the host fall out of scope by removing every $5$ and $6$ password hash, at the cost of password logins at the console. Your own rebuild of an image with the fix commit is the lasting answer.
For the kernel flaws, mitigations come from Red Hat. CVE-2026-46300: write install esp4 /bin/false and install esp6 /bin/false into /etc/modprobe.d/dirtyfrag.conf and run rmmod esp4 esp6; IPsec stops working, so check lsmod first. Or set user.max_user_namespaces=0 in /etc/sysctl.d/dirtyfrag.conf and run sysctl --system; rootless containers, sandboxed browsers and Flatpak can stop working. CVE-2026-53266: remove ebtables SNAT rules that rewrite ARP, which stops MAC translation for bridged virtual machines. Kernel 5.4 and Ubuntu focal have no fix for CVE-2026-53266, and CISA says the product may be end-of-life, so the answer there is an upgrade project. Take a host offline when a musl host with all six conditions faces the internet and neither patch nor password-off is possible, and for a kernel flaw only when untrusted users or code run on a host that fits none of the mitigations.
CVE-2026-123158 worked through, hour by hour
OpenSSH made the fix public and shipped 10.6p2 at 09:00 UTC on 5 Nov 2026, with Alpine's advisory and packages the same day. The sequence that followed is on GreyNoise's public timeline, and it shows how little time passed between the fix and the first successful attack.
| When | What happened | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 4 Nov 2026, 21:18 UTC | Damien Miller commits the OpenSSH fix, 4353fdc43ef6, with the message "avoid password authn bypass". It is not public yet. | source |
| 5 Nov 2026, 09:00 UTC | The fix is pushed to OpenSSH's public repository and OpenSSH 10.6p2 is released at 09:01. Alpine's advisory, dated the same day, lists fixed packages for every release back to 3.16. | source |
| 5 Nov 2026, 12:19 UTC | The researcher's write-up, which gives the exact trigger, appears 3 hours 18 minutes after the release. | source |
| 5 Nov 2026, 13:16 UTC | Exploit code is published on GitHub, 2.5 hours before the CVE record is published. | source |
| 5 Nov 2026, 15:46 UTC | MITRE publishes CVE-2026-123158. NVD lists it at 16:17 UTC. The CVSS base score of 8.1 comes from the MITRE CVE record; NVD has no rating of its own. | source |
| 7 Nov 2026, 00:46 UTC | GreyNoise records the first successful exploitation of one of its sensors, 39 hours 46 minutes after the fix went public. | source |
| 7 Nov 2026, 10:12 UTC | In one intrusion GreyNoise tracks as GT10, the first command runs on a victim host (cat /etc/os-release), followed by a check for passwordless doas. At 10:54 the attacker pins its command domain in /etc/hosts and writes files. | source |
| 9 Nov 2026 | CISA adds CVE-2026-123158 to KEV with forensicTriage Yes and a due date of 12 Nov 2026. | source |
The 72-hour clock from the 09:00 fix on 5 Nov ends at 09:00 on 8 Nov, a day before CISA listed the flaw and 4 days before its due date. The first step takes minutes and the second under an hour, so a team that started at hour 0 had password login off at least 35 hours before the first successful attack at 00:46 on 7 Nov, even if the step took the full 4 hours. The patch and sshd restart fall inside hours 4 to 24, which still leaves 15 hours 46 minutes before that attack. The exposure windows were 39 hours 46 minutes from fix to first attack, and 32 hours 29 minutes from the NVD listing to it. A team that began at the KEV listing on 9 Nov began 2 days after the first attack.
Related pages
Sources
- Alpine Linux security advisory, 5 Nov 2026 (fixed packages, commands, detection), read 19 Nov 2026
- OpenSSH 10.6p2 release notes, read 19 Nov 2026
- OpenSSH fix commit 4353fdc43ef6, read 19 Nov 2026
- GreyNoise, SSHole (CVE-2026-123158) activity timeline and attacker analysis, read 19 Nov 2026
- Medcrypt, independent reproduction and mitigation guidance, read 19 Nov 2026
- NVD record for CVE-2026-123158, read 19 Nov 2026
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities feed, catalog version 2026.11.18 (CVE-2026-123158, CVE-2026-46300, CVE-2026-53266), read 19 Nov 2026
- Linux 6.1.176 change log (fix for CVE-2026-53266, 19 Jun 2026), read 19 Nov 2026
- Linux 6.1.174 change log (fix for CVE-2026-46300, 23 May 2026), read 19 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026.