The 72-hour post-incident review is a 90-minute meeting with a fixed agenda, a timing table and a changes list
What NIST says the review is for
NIST SP 800-61r3 treats the review as part of improvement, not a ritual at the end. Its recovery guidance says to "Prepare an after-action report that documents the incident itself, the response and recovery actions taken, and lessons learned." It also notes that "Improvements are often identified when creating follow-up reports for incidents or holding 'lessons learned' meetings", and that lessons "should often be shared as soon as they are identified, not delayed until after recovery concludes."
That last quotation is why the review is at 72 hours and not at the end: memory of who decided what fades in days.
The template
Copy this into the incident record. The security lead fills the header and the timestamps before the meeting. The scribe, named in advance, fills the rest during it.
- Header: incident ID; CVE and product; advisory link and the time it was read; review date and start time; facilitator (held no role in the incident); scribe; attendees by role (security lead, platform engineering, application owners, communications, one executive).
- Timestamps, each with its source log: advisory published; advisory first read by your team; exposed-asset list issued; first control in place; first patched ring; last in-scope asset fixed; verification rescan clean; compromise assessment closed.
- Question 1, when did you know? What was the gap between publication and your first read, and which feed or person caught it?
- Question 2, what was decided and by whom? For each choice (mitigate, patch, accept) record the approver, the time and any expiry.
- Question 3, how long did each step take? Fill the four measures from the timestamps; name the step that took longest.
- Question 4, what was missed? Assets absent from inventory, bundled copies, hosts owned by other teams.
- Question 5, what did the tools say? For the inventory, scanner, WAF, endpoint tool or any triage agent: right, late or wrong, with one example each.
- Question 6, did anyone get in first? The window searched, the logs searched, the finding, and the closing time.
- Changes: at most five; each with an owner, a due date and a check date. The next review reads this list first.
- Publication: a one-page internal summary with the four measures, the findings and the changes.
Agenda and who records what
Send the timestamps one day ahead so the meeting is for decisions.
Scroll the table sideways for more columns
| Minutes | Item | Led by | Record left |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 to 10 | Read the timestamps and the four measures aloud | Facilitator | Confirmed or corrected timestamps |
| 10 to 30 | Questions 1 and 2: knowing and deciding | Security lead | Decision log with approvers |
| 30 to 50 | Questions 3 and 4: elapsed time and misses | Platform engineering | Longest step; missed-asset list |
| 50 to 65 | Question 5: what the tools said | Application owners | Tool findings, one per tool |
| 65 to 75 | Question 6: did anyone get in first | Security lead | Assessment window and finding |
| 75 to 90 | Changes list, owners and dates | Facilitator | Five changes or fewer |
The four measures
Time to scope runs from advisory published to exposed-asset list issued. Time to mitigate runs from advisory published to the first control on exposed assets. Time to patch runs from advisory published to the last in-scope asset fixed. Time to verify runs from the last fix to a clean rescan. Four are enough; more invite arguments about definitions.
The public dates for BeyondTrust CVE-2026-102764, advisory BT26-05
These dates are public and fix the clock for every customer with a self-hosted Remote Support appliance. BeyondTrust and Mandiant disclosed the bug on 15 Oct 2026; the vendor had released the BT26-05 patch on 8 Oct. CISA added it to its catalog on 16 Oct with a due date of 19 Oct. Mandiant dates first exploitation to 29 Aug.
Scroll the table sideways for more columns
| Interval | From | To | Elapsed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exposure before advisory | 29 Aug 2026, first exploitation | 15 Oct 2026, advisory | 47 days |
| Exploitation to detection in the hosted instance | 29 Aug 2026 | 28 Sep 2026 | 30 days |
| Patch released before advisory | 8 Oct 2026 | 15 Oct 2026 | 7 days |
| Advisory to catalog entry | 15 Oct 2026 | 16 Oct 2026 | 1 day |
| Advisory to catalog due date | 15 Oct 2026 | 19 Oct 2026 | 4 days |
A worked review: Northgate Freight, an invented company with two self-hosted appliances
Northgate Freight is invented for this example, as are all of its times (UTC). It runs a production Remote Support appliance, RS-1, and a disaster-recovery appliance, RS-2, both on 26.2.3. The advisory time is taken as 08:00 on 15 Oct 2026, the public date. The review is held on 19 Oct at 10:00, day four.
The security lead fills this table before the meeting. The four measures follow from it.
| Timestamp | Time (UTC) | Source log |
|---|---|---|
| Advisory published | 15 Oct, 08:00 | Vendor advisory (assumed time) |
| Advisory first read by the team | 15 Oct, 09:10 | On-call channel post |
| Exposed-asset list issued (RS-1 only) | 15 Oct, 14:00 | Ticket BT-1 |
| First control in place: /login and /appliance on RS-1 limited to office and VPN ranges | 15 Oct, 16:30 | Firewall change record |
| First patched ring: RS-1 | 16 Oct, 02:00 | Appliance update log |
| RS-2 found and added to the list | 16 Oct, 09:00 | Network team firewall export |
| Last in-scope asset fixed: RS-2 | 17 Oct, 02:00 | Appliance update log |
| Verification rescan clean | 17 Oct, 10:00 | Scanner report |
| Compromise assessment closed | Open; due 20 Oct, 17:00 | Assessment ticket |
The four measures and the answers to the six questions
Time to scope: complete list at 16 Oct 09:00, 25 hours after publication (the first list, at 6 hours, missed RS-2). Time to mitigate: 8 hours 30 minutes. Time to patch: 42 hours, finished 17 Oct, two days before CISA's due date of 19 Oct. Time to verify: 8 hours.
Question 1, when did you know? The team read the advisory 1 hour 10 minutes after publication because a person watching the vendor feed posted it. The patch had existed since 8 Oct, seven days before the advisory, and Northgate had no step that picks up a vendor patch released without an advisory.
Question 2, what was decided and by whom? The security lead approved the access restriction on RS-1 at 16:30, with an expiry at patching. The change approver approved patching RS-1 on 15 Oct at 17:00 and RS-2 on 16 Oct at 09:30, half an hour after it was found. A snapshot with memory was taken before RS-1 was patched, because BeyondTrust says upgrading alone does not remove an earlier compromise and Mandiant advises treating any internet-reachable unpatched appliance as possibly compromised.
Question 3, how long did each step take? The longest step was 24 hours, from RS-1 patched (16 Oct 02:00) to RS-2 patched (17 Oct 02:00), because RS-2 was not on the first list and waited for the next window. The other steps: 1 hour 10 minutes to read, 4 hours 50 minutes to list, 2 hours 30 minutes to the first control, 9 hours 30 minutes from control to the first patch, 8 hours to verify.
Question 4, what was missed? RS-2, absent from the inventory. Appliance syslog was not forwarded off the box, and Mandiant reports the actor deleted local logs, among them /ns/log/auth.log and /home/bomgar/log/bt-secrets.log, so the appliances hold no reliable record for 29 Aug to 15 Oct.
Question 5, what did the tools say? Inventory: wrong, it listed RS-1 only. Scanner: late, its check for this bug loaded on 16 Oct at 06:00, after RS-1 was patched, so the 17 Oct rescan was its first useful read. SIEM: blind, because no appliance events reached it.
Question 6, did anyone get in first? The window runs from 29 Aug, 47 days before the advisory, not from 15 Oct. BeyondTrust found an intrusion in its own hosted instance on 28 Sep, 30 days after exploitation began, and contained it within 27 minutes of the finding, so exploitation before disclosure is documented. For Northgate the finding is open until 20 Oct at 17:00, and the review records it that way.
Changes, each with an owner and a due date: forward appliance syslog and session events to the SIEM in near real time (platform engineering, 30 Oct); keep /login and /appliance restricted to trusted networks (network team, done 15 Oct); allow outbound traffic from the appliances only to required destinations (network team, 30 Oct); add the vendor's patch notes feed to the on-call channel (security lead, 23 Oct); add RS-2 and every appliance to the inventory (IT operations, 23 Oct).
When the usual review is the wrong one
Exploitation before disclosure moves the start of every clock. Time to patch measured from the advisory hides 47 days of exposure, so for a zero-day the review must open with the window in Question 6. If the compromise assessment is still open at 72 hours, hold the review anyway, mark Question 6 as open with a closing time, and schedule a short second session. For an incident that runs for weeks, follow NIST and share each lesson as it appears instead of waiting for one meeting.
A review that ends with changes lacking owners is worse than none, because it reads as finished.
Related pages
Sources
- NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3, Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations for Cyber Risk Management, read 19 Nov 2026
- BeyondTrust advisory BT26-05, read 19 Nov 2026
- BeyondTrust blog on BT26-05, read 19 Nov 2026
- Mandiant and GTIG analysis of the BeyondTrust zero-day, read 19 Nov 2026
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog entry for CVE-2026-102764, read 19 Nov 2026
- NVD record for CVE-2026-102764, read 19 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026.