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Zero Day Playbook

A zero day response plan is ten clauses long, and its drill proves that the authority table works

The plan is the emergency branch of the vulnerability plan, and it settles who may act

NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, section 3.3, tells organizations to define risk response scenarios in advance: routine patching, emergency patching, emergency mitigation and unpatchable assets. Section 3.5.3 gives the reason: "Without the processes, procedures, and tools in place to implement mitigations, too much time may be lost, and vulnerable assets may be compromised." Section 3.5.2 allows a canary period of "a few minutes to a few hours" even in an emergency.

NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3 separates incident response plans from vulnerability management plans and business continuity plans. The zero day plan belongs to the vulnerability side and hands over to the incident response plan once compromise is suspected, so it names that hand-over. SP 800-61r3 also suggests: "Consider designating an incident lead for each incident."

The deadlines in the plan come from how fast attacks start. In the Disclosure Clock, 33 bugs have a dated first exploitation: 16 within one day of disclosure, 24 within seven days, and a median gap of 2 days. By the end of day 3, 19 of the 33 had been exploited, so a plan that takes three days to find an approver acts after more than half of them have been under attack. The role playbooks hold the step-by-step work; the plan holds the authority, the triggers and the deadlines.

Ten clauses make the plan complete

Each row is a clause. Fill the second column with your own facts and name the owner in the third. The fifth column is the record the clause leaves, which a reviewer can ask for.

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ClauseWhat to writeOwnerHow it typically failsRecord it produces
1. ScopeWhat the plan covers: vulnerabilities with evidence of exploitation, and critical flaws in products reachable from outside. The products and asset classes in scope, what is out of scope and who covers it (vendor-hosted services, for example). Review dateSecurity leadVendor-hosted and supplier-run copies are left out, so the first one found mid-event has no owner.Signed scope list with its review date
2. TriggersThe levels in the trigger table below, with who declares eachSecurity leadTriggers read only CVSS, so a low-rated bug in the catalog starts nothing.Trigger table with a version number; each declaration logs the trigger and its source
3. Roles and deputiesEvent lead, platform lead, application owners, change approver, communications lead, executive approver and scribe. Each has a named deputy and a phone number that works at nightSecurity leadA deputy's phone number is out of date, or the deputy has never run an event.Roster with names, deputies and numbers, and the date of the last call test
4. Standing pre-approvalsMitigations the event lead may apply without the change board, each with its known cost and the people told: restrict a management interface to a jump host, disable a named feature, turn on a WAF rule in block mode, take a service off the internetChange approverA pre-approval nobody has costed is vetoed by the service owner on the night.Pre-approval list with cost, people told and review date
5. InputsAdvisory feeds for every vendor in the inventory, the CISA catalog, and the vendor portal accounts needed to read advisories behind a login, with a named holder and deputy. The inventory fields the first hour needs: product, version, role, exposure, owner, maintenance groupPlatform leadThe one holder of a vendor portal login is away, and the advisory sits unread behind it.Feed and portal-holder list; inventory export with its date
6. DeadlinesEvent declared within 1 hour of a trigger. Count of exposed assets within 2 hours. A first control on every internet-facing exposed asset within 4 hours. Patch ring 1 within 24 hours. Fix verified or risk accepted in writing within 72 hours. Replace these with figures you can meetEvent leadThe deadlines were copied from a template and never met, so the team ignores them.Timestamps in the decision log for declaration, count, first control, each patch ring and verification
7. CommunicationsUpdate interval (4 hours while exploitation is active), the channel, who may speak to customers, regulators and the board, and each notification duty with its trigger and deadline. Leave a duty blank rather than guessCommunications leadNobody owns the decision that the organization is aware of an incident, so a notification clock starts unnoticed.Update log with time, audience and approver; register of notification duties
8. ExceptionsA named person and a written answer for each: advisory behind a login, product owned by another team or a supplier, version with no fix, restart refused in business hours, approver away at a weekend, vendor-hosted copySecurity leadThe exception names a team, not a person, and the question lands in a queue.Exception register: person, written answer, date
9. RecordsOne decision log. Each entry holds time in UTC, decision, owner, reason and expiry. The event closes when every in-scope asset has a verified fixed build or a signed acceptance with an expiryScribeDecisions stay in chat and the log is rebuilt from memory after the event.The decision log, and its closure entry
10. Test and reviewThe drill below twice a year, a review within 72 hours of every real event, and a version history showing what each review changedSecurity leadThe drill is skipped after a reorganization and the roles list names people who have left.Drill report with times and the plan lines changed; version history

Two levels and a compromise flag decide when the plan starts

Name the trigger before the day it is needed, so that nobody debates it during the first hour.

When sources disagree, the higher level applies. An empty catalog is not a reason to wait. Apache Tomcat CVE-2026-34486 was disclosed on 9 Apr 2026, SOCRadar dates attacks against it from 24 Apr, and CISA listed it on 4 Aug, 102 days after the first attack.

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LevelTrigger (any one)Declared byWithinWhat changes
WatchA critical rating (CVSS 9.0 or higher) on a product in the inventory that is reachable from outside, with no statement of exploitationAnalyst on dutyThe same business dayInventory count and mitigation options prepared. No out-of-band changes yet
EventThe vendor says exploitation is under way; the CVE is in the CISA catalog; a named security firm reports attacks on a product in the inventoryEvent lead or deputy1 hour from first sightPre-approvals are active, the update clock starts, the decision log opens
CompromiseEvidence of exploitation on one of your own assetsEvent leadAt onceHand over to the incident response plan. Preserve evidence before patching

The authority table says who decides what, and for how long

The limits are defaults to replace with your own. Their purpose is that every decision on the first night has an owner with a deputy and a ceiling.

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DecisionDecidesIf unavailableLimit (default)Logged as
Declare a Watch or an EventEvent leadNamed SOC leadNoneTrigger, source, time
Apply a pre-approved mitigationEvent leadPlatform leadPre-approval list only; reviewed at each updateMitigation, cost, owner, expiry
Approve an out-of-band changeChange approverDeputy approver, then the executive on call60 minutes to answerRequest time, answer time, approver
Take a service offlineEvent lead, service owner informedExecutive24 hours without owner consentService, reason, restore condition
Accept a riskExecutiveDeputy executive30 days; renewal needs a new signatureAsset group, reason, expiry
Speak to customers or regulatorsCommunications lead with legalExecutiveOnly facts the event lead has confirmedStatement and approver
Close the eventEvent leadSecurity leadVerified build or signed acceptance for every assetClosure criteria met

When the usual answer is wrong

A Watch trigger set at CVSS 9.0 never opens for a bug rated low that is already exploited. Broadcom rates ESX CVE-2026-41709 at CVSS 2.7, and CISA added it to the catalog on 28 Oct 2026. Microsoft's Windows CVE-2026-68820 is rated 7.0 and was marked exploited on the day its fix shipped, 11 Aug 2026. The Event trigger must therefore key on exploitation evidence and catalog listing for products in the inventory, whatever the rating.

A one-hour declaration clock assumes the attack starts at disclosure. For BeyondTrust CVE-2026-102764 it started on 29 Aug 2026, 47 days before the 15 Oct advisory, so an Event declared on 15 Oct opens with the Compromise flag already in question and a search window of 47 days.

The drill: a Cisco ISE tabletop with timed injects

Run it twice a year for one hour with the people named in the authority table, using a real advisory. This one is Cisco's cisco-sa-ISE-ABP-VNSW7Tn5, first published 16 Sep 2026 at 16:00 GMT. It is CVE-2026-76460, an authentication bypass in an ISE API, base rating 10.0, and it affects ISE and ISE-PIC regardless of configuration. Cisco lists no workaround, recommends infrastructure access control lists, and names these fixed patches: ISE 3.1 Patch 12, 3.2 Patch 11, 3.3 Patch 12, 3.4 Patch 7 and 3.5 Patch 4. ISE 3.0 is past software maintenance and has no fix.

Teams answer from their real inventory. A team that runs no ISE uses an invented card of its own, for example 2 nodes on 3.2 Patch 9, 3 on 3.4 Patch 6 and 1 on 3.0. The scribe records the clock time of every answer.

Afterward, compare five times with clause 6: declaration, first inventory answer, first control, approver reached and statement approved. Each miss becomes a changed line in the plan with an owner and a date.

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Drill clockInjectExpected answerPass condition
T+0:00The advisory arrives. CISA lists the CVE the same dayEvent declared: the vendor states exploitation and the catalog lists itDeclared and logged within 1 hour, trigger named
T+0:30"Which nodes do we run, and which patch level?"Per node: 3.2 needs Patch 11, 3.4 needs Patch 7, 3.0 has no fix and needs a move to a supported releaseCount from the real inventory within 2 hours
T+1:00The network owner objects to access control lists on the ISE nodesPre-approved mitigation: allow only required management and control plane traffic. Cost: any admin station or integration not on the list loses access, so list the callers firstMitigation applied within 4 hours, with its cost and an expiry in the log
T+2:00The change approver does not answer the phoneDeputy approver, then the executive on callSomeone with authority is reached within 60 minutes
T+3:00An application owner refuses a restart in business hoursRing schedule or a signed acceptance with an expiry dateDecision logged with owner and expiry
T+4:00On one node, the command show logging application ise-kong/access.log | include dummyuser returns an entry for a suspicious usernameMove to the Compromise flag, hand over to the incident response plan, check every node, cross-check firewall logs outside the device because Cisco says evidence may be removed, and re-image as Cisco recommendsFlag changed and evidence preserved before any re-image
T+5:00A customer asks whether you are affectedCommunications lead with legal, using confirmed facts onlyStatement approved by the named person

An example drill result, constructed

The result below is invented to show the form. It uses the invented card above (2 nodes on 3.2 Patch 9, 3 on 3.4 Patch 6 and 1 on 3.0) and is not a record of a real team.

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Time comparedClause 6 targetConstructed resultPlan line changedOwner and date
Declaration1 hour1 h 20 min: the analyst waited for the event lead, who was in a meetingClause 2: the deputy event lead may declare an Event on the catalog trigger aloneSecurity lead, 14 days
First inventory answer2 hours3 h 10 min: patch level is not an inventory field, so each node was logged into by handClause 5: add patch level to the inventory fields the first hour needsPlatform lead, 30 days
First control4 hours3 h 40 min: met; the access-list pre-approval was usedNoneNone
Approver reached60 minutes1 h 50 min: the deputy approver's number was out of dateClause 3: the roster is call-tested each quarterSecurity lead, 14 days
Statement approvedNamed person approves5 h 25 min: met, with the confirmed facts onlyNoneNone

Sources

  1. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning, read 19 Nov 2026
  2. NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3, Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations, read 19 Nov 2026
  3. Cisco advisory cisco-sa-ISE-ABP-VNSW7Tn5, read 19 Nov 2026
  4. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, read 19 Nov 2026
  5. SOCRadar: SNOWLIGHT campaign, Tomcat exploitation dates, read 19 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026.