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Zero Day Playbook

The executive playbook for the first 72 hours

  • 0 to 4 hours: 3 steps
  • 4 to 24 hours: 3 steps
  • 24 to 72 hours: 3 steps
  • Hours elapsed: the bar under the cells

Checklist to print

  1. 0 to 4 hours3 steps, due by hour 4
    1. 1

      Fix hour zero in writing: the earlier of the time the vendor published the advisory and the time your team learned of it, with its time zone. Name the one person who can approve downtime and the one who can accept risk, and set the bridge cadence: every 4 hours until the security lead reports the fix verified on every in-scope asset, then daily.

      Done at

    2. 2

      Get the five-line brief from the security lead and use the same five lines for every later update. A filled example for the Palo Alto PAN-OS advisory of 14 Oct 2026, CVE-2026-0322 (the company figures are invented): Affected: 6 firewalls, 4 with the management interface reachable from the internet. Exploitation: confirmed by Palo Alto and listed by CISA on 14 Oct; no sign of access on our devices yet, log search unfinished. Done: management interfaces limited to the jump box. Open: 6 firewalls unpatched, Palo Alto lists no workaround and the jump box only limits who can reach the flaw, owner named, compromise search due 15 Oct 12:00. Next update: 15 Oct 08:00.

      Done at

    3. 3

      Approve emergency change authority in writing, with limits: the actions allowed without the change board (apply a mitigation, apply the fixed build, restart the service), the systems covered, the people who may act, and an expiry 72 hours after hour zero. Removal of a safeguard stays with the normal board.

      Done at

  2. 4 to 24 hours3 steps, due by hour 24
    1. 4

      Decide on downtime with three facts from the security lead: whether exploitation is confirmed, whether an unauthenticated network path exists, and whether a mitigation limits the reachable set to trusted networks. Ask the business owner for two numbers: cost per hour offline and the manual process that runs meanwhile. Then choose one: keep running behind the mitigation, run a reduced service, or take it offline until the fix is verified.

      Done at

    2. 5

      Ask counsel two questions in writing: which notification clocks apply to us if a compromise is found, and who makes the materiality determination if we are a US registrant. SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 is due "within four business days after the registrant determines that it has experienced a material cybersecurity incident," and the determination "must be made without unreasonable delay after discovery of the incident." Put the determination meeting in the calendar with a time. The deadlines for each regime are on the communications playbook.

      Done at

    3. 6

      Send the board brief 24 hours after hour zero, sooner if exploitation is confirmed on your own systems. It holds the five lines, the decisions taken with the time of each, the decisions that need the board, and what is unknown. Use dates and times, not words like recently.

      Done at

  3. 24 to 72 hours3 steps, due by hour 72
    1. 7

      Review each risk acceptance as a signed record. Template, copy and fill: Asset: ____. Exposure (who can reach it, from where): ____. Flaw (CVE, authentication needed, impact): ____. Compensating control in place and tested on: ____. Reason it cannot be fixed now: ____. Owner: ____. Approver: ____. Expiry (date and hour): ____. Reject any acceptance for an unauthenticated flaw with total control and no compensating control. Set the expiry of an internet-reachable asset at 7 days or less, since 24 of the 33 dated bugs in the Disclosure Clock were exploited within that time.

      Done at

    2. 8

      Ask for evidence, not status: the version output from the running service on each asset, and the security lead's triage outcome, one of CISA's three: no evidence of compromise, compromise suspected, compromise confirmed. Do not accept a change ticket as proof of a fix. If the outcome is suspected or confirmed, move the incident to the full incident response plan and call counsel the same hour.

      Done at

    3. 9

      Call the 72-hour review and assign each action item an owner and a date. Decide what to pre-approve for next time (emergency authority, a standing downtime rule), which end-of-life products to retire, and what to budget. Close with the hour-zero to verified-fix time as the number the board sees.

      Done at

An executive cannot patch anything, and the job in a zero-day is narrower than people expect: remove the delays that sit above the technical team. Those are approval to change production outside the calendar, a decision to give up revenue by taking a service down, and the signature on every risk that stays open. A weekly change board meets too late for most exploited bugs.

The usual failure is waiting for certainty. For a bug on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list the vendor has often already said that exploitation is under way, and the list entry itself starts the federal clock of three days for assets that need forensic triage. The facts the executive lacks in hour one are how many of your own systems are hit and whether anyone got in. Decide on what is known, name the unknowns in writing, and set a time to decide again.

When no fix exists yet

When the vendor has no fix, the executive's decision stops being when to patch and becomes what to accept and for how long. Ask the vendor's executive contact for a written date and a written statement of what is known, then set a review at 24 hours. Accept only with a compensating control in place, and shorten the expiry in line with the evidence: if exploitation is confirmed, review every day. Cisco's ISE advisory shows how little a mitigation can be: it says "There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability. However, there is a mitigation," access lists, and calls such controls temporary.

Some products will never get a fix. Cisco states that ISE release 3.0 "has reached End of Software Maintenance" and tells customers to migrate to a supported release, so for that release the choice is a migration budget or a retirement date. CISA's required action on a listed bug ends with "discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable." The executive is the person who can make that call, and the call needs a number, the cost per hour of doing without the product, set against the exposure.

CVE-2026-76460 worked through, hour by hour

Cisco published an advisory for an authentication bypass in the API of Identity Services Engine on 16 Sep 2026 at 16:00 GMT. ISE decides who joins the network, so the executive question was whether to change production at once on a flaw rated 10.0 that Cisco said was being exploited. The first two rows are the published facts. The rest are the executive decisions of this playbook with the clock time each falls due, counted from hour 0 at 16:00 GMT, so they are deadlines and not a record of what any company did. Each rests on a fact in the Cisco advisory or the CISA entry.

WhenWhat happenedSource
16 Sep 2026, 16:00 GMT (hour 0)Cisco publishes advisory cisco-sa-ISE-ABP-VNSW7Tn5 version 1.0, rated Critical with a base CVSS score of 10.0, and states: "The Cisco PSIRT is aware of active exploitation of this vulnerability." Fixed releases are 3.1 Patch 12, 3.2 Patch 11, 3.3 Patch 12, 3.4 Patch 7 and 3.5 Patch 4. Release 3.0 has reached End of Software Maintenance and has no fix. The only mitigation is infrastructure access control lists, and there is no workaround.source
16 Sep 2026 (hour 0)CISA adds CVE-2026-76460 to the KEV catalog the same day, with a due date of 19 Sep 2026 and forensic triage marked Yes.source
16 Sep 2026, by 17:00 GMT (hour 1)Decision: the executive writes hour 0 as 16:00 GMT, names the person who approves downtime and the person who accepts risk, and sets the bridge every 4 hours: 20:00, 00:00, 04:00 GMT and so on.source
16 Sep 2026, by 20:00 GMT (hour 4)Decision: the first five-line brief is read and emergency change authority is signed. It covers the access lists and the fixed patches, and expires on 19 Sep at 16:00 GMT, the 72nd hour and the CISA due date. The patches are five, one per release train, and release 3.0 has none.source
17 Sep 2026, by 00:00 GMT (hour 8)Decision: downtime call. The three facts are known from the advisory: exploitation is confirmed, no authentication is needed, and access lists limit who can reach the nodes. The executive chooses between running behind the lists, a reduced service and taking ISE offline, and writes down the cost per hour of doing without it. Cisco warns that evidence "may be removed or hidden," so a clean log alone does not close the question.source
17 Sep 2026, by 16:00 GMT (hour 24)Decision: the board brief goes out, with the forensic triage outcome the KEV entry requires, and counsel has answered the notification-clock questions. Cisco strongly recommends re-imaging nodes where malicious activity is suspected, so the brief names a rebuild budget if a hit is found.source
18 Sep 2026, by 16:00 GMT (hour 48)Decision: each open risk acceptance is signed on the template in step 7, with an expiry. Every ISE 3.0 node needs one, since 3.0 has no fix and its owner must name a migration date.source
19 Sep 2026, 16:00 GMT (hour 72)The 72-hour review is held and CISA's due date falls, a Saturday, three days after the listing. The number reported to the board is the time from 16:00 GMT on 16 Sep to the verified fix.source

The advisory and the KEV entry both carried the facts for the first brief line at hour 0: exploitation confirmed by the vendor, and a due date three days out. Counted from 16:00 GMT on Wednesday, 72 hours end on 19 Sep at 16:00 GMT, so emergency change authority had to cover a weekend, and a weekly change board could not have met in time. The mitigation cost was the decision for hour 8: every admin station and integration left off the access lists would lose contact with the nodes. Five release trains needed five fixes, and one release had none, so the 72-hour review carried a retirement or migration item for ISE 3.0.

Sources

  1. Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-ISE-ABP-VNSW7Tn5, read 19 Nov 2026
  2. CISA KEV entry for CVE-2026-76460, read 19 Nov 2026
  3. CISA BOD 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk, read 19 Nov 2026
  4. CISA BOD 26-04 Implementation Guidance, forensic triage steps, read 19 Nov 2026
  5. SEC final rule, Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure, 88 FR 51896 (4 Aug 2023), Form 8-K Item 1.05, read 19 Nov 2026
  6. The Disclosure Clock, zerodayplaybook.com (33 bugs with a dated first exploitation), read 19 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026.