# SaaS vendor playbook: the first 72 hours when the flaw is in a service you cannot patch

Playbook, sources read 19 Nov 2026

**The short answer.** When the flaw sits in a hosted product, nothing is yours to patch, so the work is proving whether your tenant was hit. This playbook gives 27 questions to send the vendor, one per line in six timed batches, plus the own-side steps, worked through the BeyondTrust BT26-05 case day by day.

In a SaaS product the vendor owns the code, the servers and the logs. Flaws are exploited against the vendor's shared platform, and the attacker gains whatever the platform holds for you: stored credentials, API keys, SSO configuration, customer data, and often a path back into your network through the integrations you set up. Nothing to patch does not mean nothing to do. The vendor often patches before you hear of the flaw: BeyondTrust patched its hosted Remote Support instances by 9 Oct 2026, six days before the 15 Oct disclosure.

What is hard is that your questions depend on the vendor's answers, and the vendor holds the only logs. You cannot see whether your tenant was in the exposure window, only ask. This page therefore gives the complete question list, the order in which to send it, and the steps you can take without waiting for any reply.

## The steps, hour by hour

| Window | Owner | Step, and why it comes here | Record to keep |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 0 to 1 hour | Security lead | Read the vendor's advisory, status page and any CISA KEV entry. Sort your product into one of three cases: hosted by the vendor and already patched, hosted and not yet patched, or self-hosted (customer-managed) so that you do patch. For BeyondTrust the advisory split exactly this way: as of 9 Oct 2026 the patch was applied to all Remote Support SaaS customers, while self-hosted customers had to apply BT26-05 themselves. Note the date the vendor says it learned of exploitation and the first exploitation date it gives.<br>The case decides the whole plan: a patched tenant still needs the exposure-window questions, an unpatched one needs controls, and a self-hosted one belongs to the asset-type playbook. | Product, case (patched, unpatched, self-hosted), source link and the time you read it. |
| 0 to 1 hour | Security lead | List what the vendor holds or can reach for you: data categories, API keys and tokens you issued to it, SSO and SAML connections, stored or injected credentials, remote-access paths into your network, webhooks, and the vendor's agents on your machines. Mark each item with the person who owns it.<br>You cannot ask 'what did the attacker reach' until you know what there was to reach. | The list, one line per item, with owner and where the secret lives on your side. |
| 1 to 4 hours | Security lead | Send the status batch in writing to the vendor's security contact and your account manager, and ask for a reply time.<br>Q1. Is the product and edition we use affected by the CVE or advisory named in your notice? Quote its identifier in the message. Name the components and the region our tenant runs in.<br>Q2. Is our tenant patched? Give the date and UTC time the fix reached it, and the build or version string it now reports.<br>Q3. From what date was our tenant running the vulnerable code, and was it reachable from the internet in that period?<br>Q4. Is any part of the fix left to us (agents, connectors, plug-ins, settings, on-premises components we installed)? Name each and the version we need.<br>Q5. Which compensating controls do you advise until our tenant is fixed, and what does each one break?<br>Q6. Who is our named incident contact, how do we reach them out of hours, and when is your next update?<br>These six answers set the exposure window and tell you whether any part of the fix is yours to do. | Date and time sent, who it went to, the ticket number, and each answer with the time it arrived. |
| 1 to 4 hours | Platform engineering | Reduce what the vendor can reach, without rotating yet. Restrict the vendor's inbound access to your network to the addresses it publishes; require SSO with phishing-resistant MFA for admin sign-in; disable dormant integrations and API accounts (disable rather than delete, so the audit trail survives); lower session lifetimes. Export your own side logs now (IdP sign-ins, API gateway logs, firewall logs for the vendor's addresses). Hold rotation of the secrets the vendor stores until it confirms the fix: Mandiant's BeyondTrust guidance says to rotate credentials only after the platform is patched, because new credentials are exposed to an attacker who still has access.<br>Controls you own can be changed in minutes; secrets held by a vendor that is still exposed cannot be safely replaced yet. | Each control changed, time, and the log export file names. |
| 4 to 24 hours | Security lead | Send the compromise batch.<br>Q7. Has the flaw been exploited against any customer? Give the date of the first known exploitation, how it was found and by whom.<br>Q8. Was our tenant accessed by anyone other than us during the exposure window? Answer yes, no or unknown, and give the evidence behind the answer.<br>Q9. If the answer is unknown, what evidence is missing: which logs, how long you keep them, and whether the attacker could have deleted them?<br>Q10. Which indicators can you share (addresses, hashes, user agents, file names, account names), and which behaviors should we hunt for if the actor changes infrastructure per victim?<br>Q11. Did any of your monitoring alert on the activity, and how was each alert handled (human review, automatic closure)?<br>Q12. Which of your systems did the attacker reach (shared infrastructure, other tenants, support tools, build systems, corporate network), and could our data be read from any of them?<br>These questions test whether your tenant was reached, and what the vendor's own detection saw; BeyondTrust's sensors fired on the privilege escalation and its automated triage closed the alerts as false positives, which only a question like Q11 brings out. | Each answer in the incident record, with 'unknown' kept as unknown and the date it was given. |
| 4 to 24 hours | Security lead | Send the data and credential batch.<br>Q13. What data of ours do you hold, by category and location, and which of it was readable from the affected component?<br>Q14. Which secrets of ours do you store (API keys, OAuth tokens, SSO signing keys, vault or integration credentials), which were readable, and in what order do you advise we rotate them?<br>Q15. Which of those secrets can we rotate ourselves, which need you, and how long do you need for the ones you hold?<br>Q16. Were sessions, tokens and API keys issued by your platform invalidated when the fix went in? If not, will you invalidate them for our tenant?<br>Q17. Did the attacker create accounts, roles, API keys, webhooks, integrations, outbound destinations or MFA registrations in our tenant? List each with its creation time. Ask the vendor to put each answer in writing even when the answer is 'none'.<br>Your rotation order and your notice duties both depend on what was readable. | Per data category and secret: readable yes, no or unknown, and your rotation owner. |
| 4 to 24 hours | Security lead | Send the evidence batch.<br>Q18. Can you export our tenant's audit, access, admin and API logs in raw form, from 90 days before the earliest exploitation date to today, and by what date?<br>Q19. What is the retention period for those logs, are they stored off the application hosts, and do they show gaps or deletions in the window?<br>Q20. Will you place a legal hold on our tenant's logs, snapshots and any forensic images that include our data? For hosted tenants ask the vendor's support to start forensic preservation, as BeyondTrust's guidance does for SaaS tenants.<br>Logs age out, and the actor in the BeyondTrust case deleted logs on the systems it reached. | Export request id, the date range asked for, the date promised, the hold confirmation. |
| 4 to 24 hours | Security lead | Hunt in your own logs for the vendor's indicators and for the actions an intruder in your tenant would take. In the tenant's audit log (once exported): new users, role changes that raise someone to administrator, new API keys, new MFA registrations, new webhooks or outbound destinations, and sign-ins from commercial VPN or residential addresses you cannot tie to a person or a ticket. In your IdP and firewall: sign-ins and connections from the vendor's service accounts at unusual hours, and any use of the keys you issued to the vendor. Go back to the first exploitation date the vendor gives, not to disclosure day.<br>The vendor's answers may be slow or incomplete, and your own logs are the evidence you can check yourself. | The queries run, the time range, hits and non-hits. |
| 24 to 72 hours | Security lead | Send the closing batch and set a reply date for every open question.<br>Q21. What was the root cause (weakness class and component), and did variant analysis find other paths to it?<br>Q22. What evidence shows the fix works: retest of every supported version, an independent test, or both?<br>Q23. What are you changing in detection and response so the same activity is caught earlier?<br>Q24. Will you give us a written incident report with a date, and tell us when new facts change your answers? Escalate unanswered items through your account executive and the contract's security contact on the date you set. Rotate the secrets from step 2 once the vendor confirms the fix, in dependency order: administrator credentials first, then users, API secrets, SSO signing keys and bind accounts, stored vault or integration credentials rotated at the target system, then anything typed into a session during the window.<br>By hour 24 the vendor has had time to answer the facts, and root cause plus fix evidence tell you whether to trust the fix. | Answers with dates, the list of open questions with owner and next date, and the rotation record. |
| 24 to 72 hours | Executive | Take the contract position.<br>Q25. When did you first learn of the flaw, of exploitation, and of exploitation in our tenant, and when did you tell us? (Compare with the notice period in our contract.)<br>Q26. Will you notify regulators or affected people on our behalf, or do you expect us to? What written statement can you give us for our own notices?<br>Q27. What remedies apply under the contract: service credits, reimbursement of forensic costs, audit rights and a right to end the agreement early? Read the agreement's incident-notice clause, service levels, audit rights and exit terms, and decide whether the vendor's notice time and its answers meet what you agreed. Decide whether any integration should be reduced to the least reach the work needs.<br>Remedies and exit rights are used in negotiation after the facts are known, and the vendor's own timeline is the baseline. | Notice time promised and delivered, remedies requested, decision and date. |
| 24 to 72 hours | Communications | If the vendor says customer data was exposed or cannot rule it out, prepare your own notices. Your clock may start when you become aware, not when the vendor tells you: GDPR Article 33, for example, gives a controller 72 hours after becoming aware of a personal data breach to notify the supervisory authority. Take the vendor's written statement (Q26), ask counsel which duties apply, and prepare a customer note that says what is known and when you will update.<br>A legal clock can already be running on the day the vendor's email arrives. | The time you became aware, who decided, drafts and the notices sent. |

Print this table as the checklist: write the time each step was done in the record column.

## When no fix exists yet

When the vendor has not yet fixed a hosted product, you have a few controls: restrict who can reach the tenant (IP allow lists, SSO only), cut or disable integrations, move the most sensitive data out of the product, and keep logs off the platform. Each costs access or convenience for users, and none replaces the fix. Do not rotate secrets the vendor stores while it is still exposed, since the new secrets reach the attacker too.

Suspend use of the service when the vendor cannot say whether your tenant was reached and the product holds credentials that open your network (a remote-access tool, a password vault, an identity service), or when exploitation is confirmed and no fix date is given. CISA's KEV action text for such entries says to follow vendor instructions, apply BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services, or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. The cost of suspending is a business process you run by hand for some days; the cost of continuing may be a path into your whole estate.

## BeyondTrust CVE-2026-102764 (BT26-05) worked through, day by day

BeyondTrust Remote Support carried an origin-validation flaw that a suspected China-nexus actor used as a zero-day against one BeyondTrust-hosted instance and one self-hosted appliance. The hosted customer could patch nothing: the vendor found and fixed it. The sources give dates; hours are given only for the 27-minute containment.

| When | What happened | Source |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 29 Aug 2026 | The actor exploits the flaw against one BeyondTrust-hosted Remote Support instance and one self-hosted appliance. | [source](https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/bt26-05) |
| 27 Sep 2026 | A zero-day campaign against another vendor's edge appliances becomes public, and Mandiant sends BeyondTrust a non-specific note. Hunts start across its SaaS fleet. | [source](https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/bt26-05) |
| 28 Sep 2026 | The hunt surfaces the affected SaaS instance. BeyondTrust contains it 27 minutes after the compromise is identified, with evidence preserved. About seven hours later Product Security reproduces the entry in a lab. Its sensors had fired when the actor escalated privileges, but an automated triage tool closed those alerts as false positives. | [source](https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/bt26-05) |
| 30 Sep 2026 | Mandiant shares findings from the self-hosted customer, confirming BeyondTrust's own. The fix is validated on a test build. | [source](https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/bt26-05) |
| 8 Oct 2026 | BeyondTrust ships the BT26-05 patch. The advisory says the patch has been applied to all Remote Support SaaS customers as of 9 Oct 2026. | [source](https://www.beyondtrust.com/trust-center/security-advisories/bt26-05) |
| 15 Oct 2026 | Coordinated disclosure: advisory BT26-05, CVE-2026-102764 (CVSS v4 9.3), BeyondTrust's blog and Mandiant's analysis. BeyondTrust knows of two affected customers and has seen no activity since August. Mandiant says customers who use the hosted service should still follow its credential and configuration steps. | [source](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-beyondtrust) |
| 16 Oct 2026 | CISA adds the CVE to KEV, forensic triage required (Yes), due date 19 Oct 2026. | [source](https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-102764) |

A hosted customer first heard of the flaw on 15 Oct, 47 days after the 29 Aug exploitation and 6 days after the platform was patched, so no patch was left to apply and the useful work was entirely in the questions. Under this playbook the status batch (Q1 to Q6) would have gone out in the first four hours of 15 Oct and asked for the exposure window from 29 Aug; the compromise batch (Q7 to Q12) would have got the answer that one hosted instance was hit; the evidence batch (Q18 to Q20) would have secured logs the actor was known to delete on the systems it reached; and credential rotation, held until the vendor's patch was confirmed, would have followed the order Mandiant publishes. BeyondTrust itself needed 30 days from first exploitation to find the hosted intrusion (29 Aug to 28 Sep), and its fix took 10 more days (28 Sep to 8 Oct), which is why a customer should plan on the vendor's logs, not its alerts.

## Related pages

- [Email gateway playbook: the first 72 hours after a critical flaw](/playbooks/email-gateway/)
- [Container base image playbook: the first 72 hours when a flaw is in the image your services build on](/playbooks/container-base-image/)
- [The remote support tool playbook for the first 72 hours](/playbooks/remote-support-tool/)

## Sources

- BeyondTrust: ARMORY CASTLE and BT26-05: https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/bt26-05 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- BeyondTrust security advisory BT26-05: https://www.beyondtrust.com/trust-center/security-advisories/bt26-05 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- Mandiant and GTIG analysis of ARMORY CASTLE: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-beyondtrust (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA KEV entry for CVE-2026-102764: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-102764 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- NVD record for CVE-2026-102764: https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-102764 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- GDPR Article 33, notification of a personal data breach: https://gdpr-info.eu/art-33-gdpr/ (read 19 Nov 2026)
- NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/61/r3/final (read 19 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://zerodayplaybook.com/playbooks/saas-vendor/
