# The remote support tool playbook for the first 72 hours

Playbook, sources read 19 Nov 2026

**The short answer.** Remote support tools hold standing, trusted access to many endpoints. ConnectWise released ScreenConnect 26.6.5 on 8 Sep 2026 for CVE-2026-84869, and CISA listed it on 11 Sep. This playbook covers client versions, the file-transfer role setting, audit-log hunting and technician credential reset.

A remote support tool is a legitimate way to run commands on endpoints, so an attacker who controls it needs no malware to move. Flaws in it usually let a low-privilege session or a rogue client move files or run code on the machine at the other end. In the ScreenConnect case (CVE-2026-84869) every version before 26.6.5 is affected, Cloud and On-Premise, in Support and Access sessions. ConnectWise's bulletin says the condition is in the ScreenConnect client and that "ScreenConnect servers are not impacted", yet its remediation for on-premises partners is still to upgrade the installation to 26.6.5 and then reinstall host clients and update access agents. The bulletin does not explain the link. Our reading, not the vendor's: the upgraded instance is where the 26.6.5 clients come from, so the server upgrade is the step that makes fixed clients available, and a console that shows 26.6.5 tells you nothing about the clients already installed.

Patching has two parts. The server or cloud instance is upgraded, then every host client and access agent must be reinstalled or updated, and ConnectWise says not to rely on the console version alone. Detection is also hard: the activity looks like a technician doing normal work, so you hunt for actions no technician made.

## The steps, hour by hour

| Window | Owner | Step, and why it comes here | Record to keep |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 0 to 1 hour | Security lead | Inventory every ScreenConnect instance (cloud and on-premises, including those bundled with Automate), the console version at Administration > Overview, and the version of each technician client and endpoint client. Read client versions across the fleet instead of on one workstation. PowerShell on a Windows host: `Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*,HKLM:\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\* \| Where-Object DisplayName -like 'ScreenConnect Client*' \| Select-Object DisplayName,DisplayVersion`. osquery or an EDR query: `SELECT name, version FROM programs WHERE name LIKE 'ScreenConnect Client%';`. Anything below 26.6.5 is affected.<br>The flaw is in the client, and updating the console does not update clients. CISA marks forensic triage as required for the KEV entry, so each affected endpoint also needs the evidence step below. | Instance, deployment type, server version, and the count of clients below 26.6.5. |
| 0 to 4 hours | Platform engineering | As the interim step, open Administration > Security > Roles, edit each role, and deselect TransferFiles (TransferFilesInSession on legacy versions) for every session group, then save. Review each session group with permissions shown in bold and check Scoped Permissions.<br>ConnectWise names this as its mitigation; it reduces exposure and does not replace the update. | Roles edited, before and after permission state, and the time. |
| 0 to 4 hours | Security lead | Open Administration > Overview and read Latest Eligible Version. On-premises partners must run 25.4 or later to upgrade to 26.6.5; if the license is out of maintenance, renew it first. For cloud, the vendor FAQ says instances are upgraded automatically and the bulletin says no action is required there, but host clients still need to be reinstalled and access agents updated.<br>The upgrade path decides if today's task is an upgrade or a license step. | Current version, eligible version, and the license date. |
| 0 to 4 hours | Security lead | Search the ScreenConnect audit log (Administration > Audit, using the Session Event Type filter) and EDR for file activity no technician made. ConnectWise's session events reference lists SentFiles (sending a file via the host client), CopiedFiles and DraggedFiles (transferring a file from a session by copy and paste or by drag-and-drop), RanFiles (running a file on a remote session) and RanCommand (output from a command run from the Host page). ConnectWise documents no separate event for a transfer made without Host confirmation, so such a transfer shows as one of these events: look for sessions no technician opened, unknown users and unknown source addresses. The audit page notes that the database maintenance plan decides how long data is kept, so export the log first. Huntress reported audit entries with RunFiles or RanFiles showing scripts 1.vbs to 4.vbs run by Process: Guest, and ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe launching wscript.exe; these are Huntress's general rogue-client indicators, not tied to CVE-2026-84869 or to ConnectWise's SCKit report. Query: parent image ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe with child wscript.exe, cscript.exe or powershell.exe.<br>Transfer and execution are the two actions the bulletin describes, and these events are where the audit log records them, so each one without a technician behind it needs an owner. | Query text, period, hosts hit, and the audit entries exported. |
| 0 to 4 hours | Platform engineering | On every on-premises instance, open the installed extensions list and look for the five extensions ConnectWise named on 13 Nov 2026: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link. Disable them and do not reinstall them. Also disable ITBoost Integration, RepairShopr Integration and Guest Session Starter, which ConnectWise disabled in its cloud and marketplace. ConnectWise cannot disable extensions on an on-premises server for you. A listed extension alone does not show compromise, so then review Run Command history, extension API activity, administrative accounts, permission changes and Toolbox records, and investigate endpoints with EDR rather than through ScreenConnect.<br>ConnectWise reports unauthorized access through these extensions, separate from CVE-2026-84869, and a client update does not remove them. | Per instance: which of the eight extensions were installed, the time each was disabled, and the activity reviewed. |
| 4 to 24 hours | Platform engineering | Upgrade on-premises instances to 26.6.5 or later. Afterward reinstall host clients and update access agents, because upgrading the server alone leaves old clients. Verify the version on the endpoint, not only in the console. At scale, build the Windows installer from the upgraded instance and push it with your endpoint tool (Intune, Configuration Manager, Group Policy or an RMM job) as a silent install, for example msiexec /i ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi /qn, to every host client, then rerun the step 1 query and list hosts still below 26.6.5 for reinstall by hand. Technician workstations are updated the same way. ConnectWise publishes no deployment command, so this method is ours; the vendor's instruction is only to reinstall host clients and update access agents.<br>The vendor's remediation covers clients as well as the server, and only a client at 26.6.5 or later is fixed. | Per instance: version before and after, time, and the clients updated. |
| 4 to 24 hours | Security lead | Look for persistence. Huntress indicators for rogue ScreenConnect clients: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run value WindowsServiceHost pointing to WindowsServiceHost.vbs in AppData, and the staging files %TEMP%\value.txt, map.txt, out.enc and runner.ps1. Look for UltraViewer and Quick Assist installed on hosts where no one asked for them. For the SCKit spread that client 26.6.5 blocks, which ConnectWise describes as moving from an infected endpoint to connecting technician workstations, run the same process query (ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe as parent of wscript.exe, cscript.exe or powershell.exe) on the workstations of technicians who connected to hosts running a client below 26.6.5.<br>Huntress saw these alongside rogue ScreenConnect clients, and removing the client does not remove a Run key. | Hosts checked, indicators found, and the containment action. |
| 4 to 24 hours | Security lead | If any host shows signs of compromise, isolate the server, back it up for analysis and keep it offline until it is investigated, rebuilt and patched. Reset passwords, review the audit log and force all technicians to sign back in.<br>This is the ConnectWise checklist for a suspected compromise. | Server isolated, backup name, rebuild date. |
| 24 to 72 hours | Security lead | Review users and roles, remove any user you do not recognize, reset passwords and enable MFA, as the vendor advises after patching. Review authentication, extension installation, administrative, Run Command and Toolbox records, and revoke active web sessions.<br>Someone who used the tool before the patch may still hold a valid account. | User list with owner for each, MFA status, and the audit export. |
| 24 to 72 hours | Executive | Decide whether standing access by outside support staff stays, and whether the tool may be reachable from the internet at all. Record the decision, the owner and the review date.<br>The patch removes one flaw, and the access model stays the same until someone decides. | Decision, owner, date. |

Print this table as the checklist: write the time each step was done in the record column.

## When no fix exists yet

If no fixed release exists, the mitigations for a remote support tool are to remove the dangerous permission, shrink who can use the tool, and take it offline. The ScreenConnect example shows the first (step 2): technicians lose file transfer in sessions, a feature they use daily. It reduces exposure and does not replace the update.

Taking the tool offline stops all remote support, so decide by exposure. If the server is reachable from the internet, the vendor or CISA reports exploitation, and the permission change cannot be made, take it offline; if the server sits behind a VPN and the permission is off, keep it up with the audit log under watch. On an infected instance, isolate and keep the server offline until it is rebuilt and patched.

## CVE-2026-84869 worked through, day by day

ConnectWise released ScreenConnect 26.6.5 on 8 Sep 2026 for CVE-2026-84869, a client file-transfer flaw that may allow files to be transferred and executed through an active session without authorization or Host confirmation. The bulletin says "ScreenConnect servers are not impacted." The CNA rates it CVSS 3.1 9.9; ConnectWise's own bulletin rating is Priority 1, High, the label it gives vulnerabilities that are being targeted or at higher risk of being targeted. No public source gives a first attack date or victim count for this CVE itself: the dated reports of exploitation are CISA's SSVC entry of 10 Sep and the KEV listing of 11 Sep. The bulletin, KEV and Huntress give dates, not hours, so the table runs in days.

| When | What happened | Source |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 20 Aug 2026 | Huntress reports its first rogue ScreenConnect client incident, general client activity. | [source](https://www.huntress.com/blog/rogue-screenconnect-installations) |
| 3 Sep 2026 | ConnectWise publishes the interim Guest File Transfer advisory with the role mitigation. | [source](https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories) |
| 8 Sep 2026 | ConnectWise releases 26.6.5 and the bulletin for CVE-2026-84869, rated Priority 1 High; NVD publishes the CVE. | [source](https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/2026-09-08-screenconnect-bulletin) |
| 10 Sep 2026 | CISA's SSVC data in the NVD record marks exploitation as active, the earliest dated report of exploitation of this CVE. | [source](https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-84869) |
| 11 Sep 2026 | CISA adds the CVE to KEV, due date 14 Sep 2026, forensic triage required. | [source](https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-84869) |
| 12 Nov 2026, 18:45 UTC | ConnectWise reports unauthorized access to some partner on-premises ScreenConnect environments. It has found no evidence that initial access involved a ScreenConnect vulnerability; the activity appears to abuse independent third-party extensions from the RMM+ family (about 400 partner environments had at least one installed), which expose an API that runs remote commands. Researchers say attackers then deployed a toolkit called SCKit meant to spread from an infected endpoint to connecting technician workstations. The fix for CVE-2026-84869 in client 26.6.5 blocks that spread technique. | [source](https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories) |
| 13 Nov 2026, 21:15 UTC | ConnectWise tells on-premises partners to disable Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link now, and recommends that all partners also disable ITBoost Integration, RepairShopr Integration and Guest Session Starter, which it disabled in cloud environments and its marketplace. All partners must verify every technician client runs 26.6.5 or later. | [source](https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories) |
| 16 Nov 2026, 20:00 UTC | ConnectWise reports its investigation complete and repeats that the five extensions stay disabled and that every technician client must run 26.6.5 or later. It says researchers continue to report activity against on-premises environments where the extensions remain enabled and ScreenConnect is not updated. | [source](https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories) |

The interim role change was published 5 days before the fix, so an owner who followed the vendor feed could have applied the role change on 3 Sep, 8 days before CISA listed the CVE on 11 Sep. The upgrade on 8 Sep, then client reinstall, would have met the 14 Sep due date. The November notices show the cost of skipping clients: more than 2 months after the release, ConnectWise still asked every partner to verify each technician client, because the SCKit spread step is blocked only by client 26.6.5 and later. The extensions are a separate risk: no client update removes an enabled RMM+ extension, so the extension check belongs in the same first day.

## Related pages

- [The artifact repository and CI system playbook for the first 72 hours](/playbooks/artifact-repository/)
- [Email gateway playbook: the first 72 hours after a critical flaw](/playbooks/email-gateway/)
- [CMS and storefront playbook: the first 72 hours after a critical flaw](/playbooks/cms-and-storefront/)

## Sources

- ConnectWise ScreenConnect bulletin, 8 Sep 2026: https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/2026-09-08-screenconnect-bulletin (read 19 Nov 2026)
- ConnectWise advisories page: https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA KEV entry for CVE-2026-84869: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-84869 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- NVD record for CVE-2026-84869: https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-84869 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- Huntress report on rogue ScreenConnect installations: https://www.huntress.com/blog/rogue-screenconnect-installations (read 19 Nov 2026)
- ConnectWise ScreenConnect documentation, session events: https://docs.connectwise.com/ScreenConnect_Documentation/Developers/Session_events (read 19 Nov 2026)
- ConnectWise ScreenConnect documentation, audit page: https://docs.connectwise.com/ScreenConnect_Documentation/Get_started/Administration_page/Audit_page (read 19 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://zerodayplaybook.com/playbooks/remote-support-tool/
