# The communications playbook for the first 72 hours

Playbook, sources read 19 Nov 2026

**The short answer.** Communications writes only what the incident record supports. The page gives a complete holding statement, a customer update, a support script and the legal clocks quoted from their texts: SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 four business days, NIS2 24-hour early warning, GDPR 72 hours. The worked case is BeyondTrust, exploited 47 days before disclosure.

Communications is the one role that must publish before the facts are in. The security lead may need days to learn whether anyone got in, while customers, staff and sometimes regulators need words in hours. The risk runs both ways. A statement that says "no impact" on hour three is wrong if an intruder arrived first, and silence leaves the story to others. The fix is to write only claims that carry a source and a time, and to say what is unknown.

Zero-days make this harder in one way. The disclosure date is not the exposure date. BeyondTrust and Mandiant dated the first exploitation of CVE-2026-102764 to 29 Aug 2026, 47 days before the advisory of 15 Oct 2026, so a customer's "we found nothing" is only as good as the logs behind it and the date they start from. Separately, legal clocks run from the moment you become aware of an incident or determine one is material, never from the date of an advisory, so the person who writes the statement must also see the clock table.

## The steps, hour by hour

| Window | Owner | Step, and why it comes here | Record to keep |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 0 to 1 hour | Communications | Get the facts sheet from the security lead and mark each line Confirmed, Unconfirmed or Unknown, with the source and the time. Add a basis to every "no evidence" claim: which logs, which systems, from which date to which date. A claim that rests on logs stored only on the affected device is weak, because actors known for appliance zero-days delete local logs.<br>Every sentence you publish later is checked against this sheet, and a missing basis is what turns a true statement into a misleading one. | The facts sheet with version numbers, and the basis line for each no-evidence claim. |
| 0 to 1 hour | Communications | Name one spokesperson and one approver, plus a legal reviewer who can answer within the hour. Route every press, customer and regulator inquiry to the spokesperson. Staff and partners get no other channel, and no one posts on social media about the incident.<br>Two people saying different things in the first hours cannot be taken back, and a named reviewer is what keeps drafting inside the 4-hour window. | Names, mobile numbers, the approval route and the time each was confirmed. |
| 1 to 4 hours | Communications | Write the holding statement from this template and publish it only when the approver signs. <br>[Date, time, time zone] Update on [CVE ID], a vulnerability in [product and versions].<br>What we know: On [date], [vendor or source] disclosed [CVE ID], which lets an attacker [effect in one plain clause]. [The vendor or CISA] reports it is being exploited.<br>What we are doing: We use [product] in [named systems]. We are [applying the vendor's mitigation or fix] and reviewing [logs] from [lookback start date] for signs of misuse.<br>What we have found so far: [Option A: We have found no evidence of misuse in [logs, systems] from [date] to [time]. The review is not finished. / Option B: We have found activity consistent with exploitation on [systems] and have started our incident response.]<br>What you can do: [one action for customers, such as check the version or rotate credentials].<br>Next update: [time, time zone] at [URL], or sooner if this changes. Contact: [name or address].<br>Leave out "no impact", "fully secure" and "isolated incident" until the triage report supports them.<br>The statement exists to give the first answer and the time of the second, and the template forces the unknowns onto the page. | The published text, the time, the approver, and the facts-sheet version each line came from. |
| 1 to 4 hours | Communications | Brief support and account teams with a three-sentence script and an escalation list. Sentence 1: "[Vendor] disclosed a vulnerability in [product] on [date], and it is being exploited." Sentence 2: "We are [applying the fix or mitigation] and checking for misuse, and we will update at [time]." Sentence 3: "If you see [specific sign], tell us at [address]." Questions on data, impact, liability, causes or dates go to the spokesperson, and the person answering writes the question down.<br>A customer who asks three people should hear one answer, and the written questions show what the next update must cover. | The script version, the list of staff briefed, and the questions logged with time. |
| 1 to 4 hours | Communications | Put the notification clocks in the incident record with counsel, one line per regime, each with a trigger, a deadline in UTC and an owner. <br>SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05: "within four business days after the registrant determines that it has experienced a material cybersecurity incident"; the materiality determination "must be made without unreasonable delay after discovery of the incident"; missing information goes in an amendment within four business days of becoming available. <br>NIS2 Article 23(4), essential and important entities: an early warning "within 24 hours of becoming aware of the significant incident"; an incident notification "within 72 hours"; a final report "not later than one month after the submission of the incident notification." <br>GDPR Article 33(1): to the supervisory authority "without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware of it," unless the breach "is unlikely to result in a risk," and a later filing "shall be accompanied by reasons for the delay"; Article 33(2): a processor tells the controller "without undue delay"; Article 34(1): data subjects are told "without undue delay" when the risk is high. <br>Contracts: list the hour-based notice clauses in your customer agreements.<br>The shortest clock is the 24-hour early warning, so the table must exist before anyone knows whether it applies. | For each regime: applies yes or no, trigger event and time, deadline in UTC, filer, counsel's sign-off. |
| 4 to 24 hours | Communications | Draft the regulator text now, so the filing is a copy and not a writing task. For NIS2 the early warning states, where applicable, "whether the significant incident is suspected of being caused by unlawful or malicious acts or could have a cross-border impact." For GDPR, Article 33(3) requires the nature of the breach with the categories and approximate number of data subjects and records, the contact point, the likely consequences and the measures taken or proposed. Article 33(4) allows the information "in phases without undue further delay."<br>The filing deadline falls inside the next 24 to 72 hours, and a draft with gaps marked Unknown can go out on time while the facts arrive. | The draft, each gap marked Unknown, the reviewer, and the time the filing was sent with the reference number. |
| 4 to 24 hours | Communications | Publish update 2 to customers at the time promised in the holding statement, even if nothing has changed, using this template. <br>Status: [Investigating / Mitigated / Fixed and verified].<br>Changed since the last update: [facts, dated].<br>Who is affected: [products, versions, customer groups], and who is not, with the basis.<br>What we found: [findings and the period reviewed, or "review not finished"].<br>What you should do: [steps with exact versions or settings].<br>Next update: [time, time zone].<br>An update on time with nothing new keeps customers from filling the silence, and keeping the same headings lets them see what changed. | The text, the time, the channels used and the number of customers who replied. |
| 24 to 72 hours | Communications | Publish the fix-verified update only after the security lead supplies the verification output: state the date, the version or control now in place, and the lookback period searched. If any earlier statement turns out wrong, correct it in the same channel with the same prominence and say what changed. Do not use "out of an abundance of caution" to hide a fact that is known.<br>A fix claim is checked by customers who run the same product, and a correction made fast costs less than one found by someone else. | Verification evidence cited, the published text, the corrections issued and their times. |
| 24 to 72 hours | Communications | Close the loop with employees and partners, then archive every statement with its time, approver and source line in a claims ledger of three columns: claim, evidence, basis. File the ledger with the incident record. Diary the NIS2 final report date, one month after the 72-hour notification, and any 8-K amendment date.<br>The ledger is what counsel and regulators ask for in a review, and the diary dates are the ones teams miss after the first 72 hours. | The claims ledger, the distribution list, and the diary dates for the final report and amendments. |

Print this table as the checklist: write the time each step was done in the record column.

## When no fix exists yet

When the vendor has no fix, the statement cannot say "we have patched". Say what is in place (the mitigation, the date it went in, what it limits), what is not (the flaw remains), and when you will next check. Do not promise a fix date that the vendor has not given. If the mitigation limits access, name who loses it, because customers will find out within minutes. BeyondTrust did this in its own post: it reported what it had observed, what it withheld ("we are withholding the technical details") and what it could not prove, saying it lacked forensic proof of the AI-enabled tooling it suspected.

If you take a service offline, publish what is unavailable, since when, and the time of your next review, not a promised time of return. A return time that slips costs more trust than the outage. Counsel should see the offline statement before it goes out, because a service outage can itself be a significant incident under NIS2 if it causes "severe operational disruption."

## CVE-2026-102764 worked through, hour by hour

BeyondTrust and Mandiant disclosed on 15 Oct 2026 that a suspected China-nexus actor had exploited a flaw in Remote Support as a zero-day since 29 Aug 2026. The rows show what the vendor said and when, which is the standard a customer's own statements are compared with.

| When | What happened | Source |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 29 Aug 2026 | The actor exploits the flaw as a zero-day against one BeyondTrust-hosted Remote Support instance and one self-hosted appliance. | [source](https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/bt26-05) |
| 28 Sep 2026 | BeyondTrust's threat hunting finds the hosted instance; the company contains it "within 27 minutes" of first detection. Its post adds that its sensors fired but a third-party tool's automated triage "closed those alerts as false positives." | [source](https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/bt26-05) |
| 30 Sep 2026 | Mandiant shares findings from the self-hosted customer that confirm what BeyondTrust found on 28 Sep. | [source](https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/bt26-05) |
| 8 Oct 2026 | BeyondTrust releases the BT26-05 patch. Hosted instances are patched automatically, and the advisory says all hosted customers were patched as of 9 Oct. | [source](https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/bt26-05) |
| 15 Oct 2026 | Coordinated disclosure: advisory BT26-05, the CVE record, BeyondTrust's post and Mandiant's analysis are published the same day. BeyondTrust says it is "withholding the technical details" while appliances are patched. | [source](https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/bt26-05) |
| 15 Oct 2026 (post text) | BeyondTrust: "we are only aware of the two impacted customers mentioned above, and have not seen evidence of adversary activity since August." The sentence is dated to the last update of the post. It also says the actor deletes logs and that off-box copies are often the only record. | [source](https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/bt26-05) |
| 16 Oct 2026 | CISA adds the CVE to the KEV catalog with a due date of 19 Oct 2026 and forensic triage marked Yes. BeyondTrust updates its post at 12:00 EDT. | [source](https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-102764) |
| 4 Nov 2026 | BeyondTrust updates advisory BT26-05. | [source](https://www.beyondtrust.com/trust-center/security-advisories/bt26-05) |

Three features of the vendor's text carry over to a customer's. Every claim is dated ("as of the time of the last update"), the limits of knowledge are stated, and the vendor admits its own miss. A customer on a self-hosted appliance would have two points of its own: the lookback starts on 29 Aug 2026, not 15 Oct, and any no-evidence line has to rest on logs held off the appliance.

Now the clocks, on invented facts. Suppose a team confirms at 14:00 UTC on 15 Oct 2026 that an attacker took personal data from an appliance. The NIS2 early warning is due at 14:00 UTC on 16 Oct and the incident notification at 14:00 UTC on 18 Oct, and the final report one month after that notification. The GDPR notice to the supervisory authority is also due by 14:00 UTC on 18 Oct, so the weekend is in the window. If the company determines on 15 Oct that the incident is material, the 8-K is due on 21 Oct 2026, the fourth business day. The holding statement is due inside 4 hours, ahead of all of them.

## Related pages

- [The executive playbook for the first 72 hours](/playbooks/executive/)
- [Application runtime playbook: the first 72 hours when a flaw is in PHP or another language runtime on your servers](/playbooks/application-runtime/)
- [The endpoint fleet playbook for the first 72 hours](/playbooks/endpoint-fleet/)

## Sources

- BeyondTrust, ARMORY CASTLE and BT26-05: What Security Teams Need to Know: https://www.beyondtrust.com/blog/entry/bt26-05 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- BeyondTrust Security Advisory BT26-05: https://www.beyondtrust.com/trust-center/security-advisories/bt26-05 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group, ARMORY CASTLE Exploits BeyondTrust: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-beyondtrust (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA KEV entry for CVE-2026-102764: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-102764 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- SEC final rule 33-11216, 88 FR 51896 (4 Aug 2023), Form 8-K Item 1.05: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/full_text/html/2023/08/04/2023-16194.html (read 19 Nov 2026)
- Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2), Article 23, Reporting obligations: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022L2555 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), Articles 33 and 34: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679 (read 19 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://zerodayplaybook.com/playbooks/communications/
