# Application runtime playbook: the first 72 hours when a flaw is in PHP or another language runtime on your servers

Playbook, sources read 19 Nov 2026

**The short answer.** A flaw in the language runtime that serves your web requests is patched on the host: the package, the server module or pool, and its configuration. This playbook gives the PHP commands for hours 0 to 72, from finding which server API runs to the audit rules, worked through PHP2Shell.

A runtime is the program that executes your application code, and a web-facing flaw in it is reached by an ordinary HTTP request before any of your code runs. For PHP2Shell, CVE-2026-109618 is triggered in multipart form parsing. With Apache mod_php that parsing happens before application code, so no login and no application bug is needed. The attacker gains code execution as the web worker account, with the application's files, database credentials and network position. PHP rates mod_php the highest risk.

The runtime is hard to patch for reasons that are not about code. One host can run three PHP builds at once, such as mod_php, PHP-FPM and a command-line binary, and the command-line version proves nothing about the web one. Distribution packages fix the flaw under an old version number. The behavior depends on configuration that lives in php.ini, pool files, virtual hosts and .htaccess files. And a runtime upgrade touches every request the host serves. This playbook is about the PHP process and its configuration on servers and virtual machines. Images built from a base are handled by the container playbook.

## The steps, hour by hour

| Window | Owner | Step, and why it comes here | Record to keep |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 0 to 1 hour | Security lead | Find every web-serving PHP, by server API (SAPI), not by version alone. ps -ef \| grep -Ei 'php-fpm\|php-cgi\|frankenphp\|lsphp\|httpd\|apache2' \| grep -v grep lists running servers, and apachectl -M \| grep -i php (apache2ctl -M on Debian and Ubuntu) shows whether Apache loads mod_php. List packages: dpkg -l 'php*' 'libapache2-mod-php*' or rpm -qa 'php*'. A host that runs PHP only from the command line, for cron jobs, drops out of web scope. Mark mod_php first, because PHP rates it highest.<br>CISA's alert says the flaws affect every PHP serving web requests, and the order of work is set by the SAPI. | One row per host: the SAPI, the web server, the package name, and the owning team. |
| 0 to 4 hours | Platform engineering | Resolve the version question per host. Run the web binary: php-fpm -v, php-cgi -v, or for mod_php php -v after confirming the module. Then ask the package for the fix, because distributions backport without changing the number: rpm -q --changelog php \| grep -i 109618 or apt changelog php8.3 \| grep -i 109618, and the same with 109619. Fixed upstream releases are 8.2.35, 8.3.36, 8.4.27 and 8.5.12. Anything on 8.1 or older has no upstream fix; mark it for step 10.<br>A version string below the fixed release can still be patched, and a number above it can hide a different build. | Host, binary run, version printed, changelog hit yes or no, and branch (8.5, 8.4, 8.3, 8.2, 8.1 or older). |
| 0 to 4 hours | Security lead | Order exposure by what an anonymous client can do. From outside the network: curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X POST -F a=b https://host/index.php; any PHP response, even an error page, means the server passed a multipart POST to PHP. Find the handler paths in config: grep -R 'fastcgi_pass\\|SetHandler\\|proxy:fcgi\\|AddHandler' /etc/nginx /etc/apache2 /etc/httpd. A path that requires login before PHP removes the unauthenticated condition. Internet-facing mod_php with a public entry point goes first, FPM behind a login last.<br>The flaw is unauthenticated remote code execution, so who can send the POST decides the order. | Per vhost: reachable from internet, passes to PHP, requires login, SAPI. |
| 0 to 4 hours | Platform engineering | On hosts that cannot be patched in hours, apply the stated interim settings as admin values and restart every worker. CVE-2026-109618: memory_limit=-1. In an FPM pool: php_admin_value[memory_limit] = -1. In Apache: php_admin_value memory_limit -1. CVE-2026-109619: php_admin_value[session.upload_progress.enabled] = 0, and on PHP 8.5 php_admin_value[fatal_error_backtraces] = 0. Restart: systemctl restart php8.3-fpm or apachectl graceful (restart the service if graceful does not take it). Prove the pool value with php-fpm -tt \| grep -i memory_limit, and check nothing resets it in .htaccess or a pool: grep -Rn 'memory_limit' /etc/php* /etc/php-fpm.d /etc/apache2 /etc/httpd. Costs: a runaway script can use all host memory, and upload progress stops. This is partial: PHP says a failed mmap() can still reach the vulnerable path, and only the upgrade is complete.<br>These settings narrow the demonstrated paths while the upgrade is scheduled, and admin values stop an application or .htaccess from undoing them. | The config change with its commit, the php-fpm -tt output, the restart time, and the exception end date. |
| 4 to 24 hours | Platform engineering | Frontend limits, where the application allows them. Keep post_max_size conservative and enforce the decoded size at the frontend; lower max_input_nesting_level; bound input variables and multipart parts. If the application has no uploads or multipart forms, refuse them before PHP: in nginx, if ($content_type ~* "^multipart/form-data") { return 415; } in the server block, then repeat the step 3 curl and expect 415. Cost: file uploads and multipart forms stop working. Do not use RLIMIT_AS or RLIMIT_DATA as a memory cap: they make mmap() fail and trigger the vulnerable path.<br>A refusal before PHP runs removes the confirmed trigger for hosts with no upload use, with no change to the runtime. | The frontend rule, the test request and status code, and the list of routes that need uploads. |
| 4 to 24 hours | Platform engineering | Upgrade the package and restart. Debian and Ubuntu: apt-get update && apt-get install --only-upgrade 'php8.3*' (use your branch). RHEL family: dnf upgrade 'php*'. Then restart the FPM service or Apache; a package install does not replace the running workers. Proof: ls -l /proc/$(pgrep -o php-fpm)/exe shows (deleted) when a worker still runs the old binary, and ps -o lstart= -p $(pgrep -o php-fpm) must be later than rpm -q --qf '%{INSTALLTIME:date}\n' php-fpm. Repeat the changelog grep from step 2 and the version commands. Run it across hosts with ansible web -m command -a 'php-fpm -v'.<br>Upgrading the package without restarting leaves the vulnerable code in memory, and the exe check catches it. | The package version after, the worker start time, the changelog hit, and the ansible output saved with the date. |
| 4 to 24 hours | Application owner | Test on staging with real traffic patterns. The fix is a patch release within a branch, but it changes how out-of-memory is handled: PHP now soft-fails at the next VM safe point and hard-exits with _exit() at a second, higher memory threshold. Run composer check-platform-reqs, diff php -m against php-fpm -m before and after, upload the largest file your users send, run an upload at the post_max_size limit, and check session upload progress if the application uses it. Look for workers that exit with a memory limit error where the old build let a script run on.<br>The owner finds regressions on one host before the platform team rolls the change to all, and a failed upgrade is what pushes teams back to the interim setting. | The test list, the pass or fail, the largest upload tested, and the approval to roll out. |
| 24 to 72 hours | Platform engineering | Remove the conditions CVE-2026-109619 needs, on patched and unpatched hosts. Find per-request overrides: grep -Rn 'php_value\\|php_flag\\|PHP_VALUE' /etc/apache2 /etc/nginx /etc/httpd and find /var/www -name .htaccess \| xargs grep -n 'php_'. Move them into php.ini, pool or server configuration applied at startup, because INI warnings raised during request startup are a confirmed consumer. Audit in isolation with log_errors=On, a working error_log and error_reporting=E_ALL in startup configuration, and review Apache, FPM and proxy logs for Deprecated and Warning lines before target scripts run, and for the string Maximum execution time exceeded. A clean log is not proof of safety, per PHP. Keep session.upload_progress.enabled=0 after patching if no application uses it.<br>The upgrade removes the flaw, but the audit shows which settings generated the warnings that made it reachable, and any later regression of the same kind. | The overrides found and moved, the audit period, the log lines matched, and the owner for each application setting. |
| 24 to 72 hours | Security lead | Hunt for exploitation on the origin. Success is invisible at the edge. Search Apache and FPM error logs for worker crashes: grep -h 'AH00051' /var/log/apache2/error.log* (path varies by distribution). Look for web workers that launched shells: pstree -a -p $(pgrep -o php-fpm) \| grep -Ei 'sh\|bash\|curl\|wget', and unexpected outbound connections: ss -tnp \| grep -E 'php\|httpd\|apache2'. Start a recorder for the next days: auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F uid=www-data -k webexec (replace www-data with your worker account), then ausearch -k webexec. In access logs, search the User-Agent php2shell-109618 and the multipart boundary B7kQpoc618 where bodies are logged, but treat both as stale: Fastly says user agents, source IPs and body sizes go stale within a day. Rule out React2Shell look-alikes: they carry a Next-Action header, which PHP traffic never does. CISA published a SIGMA rule. If a vulnerable host saw it, treat the worker account's credentials as exposed.<br>The exploit leaves no payload string to match, so the signal is a crash or a shell child process, and these searches are cheap after the fix is in. | The searches with time ranges and counts, the audit rule, and the hosts moved to incident response. |
| 24 to 72 hours | Platform engineering | Handle runtimes with no upstream fix. For PHP 8.1 and older, ask the distributor for a backport and prove it with the changelog grep, or schedule a move to a supported branch. Until then, CISA tells operators to take PHP-based systems offline, and a WAF may give partial protection. Put each exception in the record with an owner and an end date.<br>These hosts are exploitable as shipped, and the longer they run the more the exception is a risk decision someone must own. | The exception list: host, branch, distributor answer, compensating control, owner, end date. |

Print this table as the checklist: write the time each step was done in the record column.

## When no fix exists yet

The runtime case without a fix is PHP 8.1 and older, and distributions that have not yet shipped a backport. For CVE-2026-109618 the interim controls are memory_limit=-1, conservative post_max_size with the decoded size enforced at the frontend, lower max_input_nesting_level, a multipart block at the frontend where uploads are not used, and a cgroup memory.max limit with the caveat that killing the whole cgroup can take down the FPM master and all workers. For CVE-2026-109619 there is no setting that covers every producer and consumer: fatal_error_backtraces=0 on 8.5, session.upload_progress.enabled=0, startup-only INI, and pm.max_requests=1, which makes each worker serve one request at a heavy throughput cost. Each is partial.

Take the service offline when an unpatched or unsupported PHP serves an entry point to anonymous clients and no frontend rule can stop multipart or login-less access. CISA says to do this for systems that cannot be updated and for PHP 8.1 and earlier. If the service must stay up, put a login or VPN in front of every PHP path first: that removes the unauthenticated condition, and so makes the host a smaller target while a backport or a migration is prepared. A WAF rule is partial. Fastly's Next-Gen WAF has a CVE-specific rule for both CVEs, and Fastly warns that circulating IP block lists include VPN exits, Tor exits and residential addresses carrying ordinary traffic.

## CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 worked through, hour by hour

PHP2Shell is two bugs in one release. CVE-2026-109618 (CVSS 9.8) corrupts request state on an out-of-memory failure, and CVE-2026-109619 (CVSS 8.1) leaves stale state that a later request on the same worker reads. CISA lists both in KEV. Fastly measured exploitation tools in its telemetry before the fix was public, so this case shows what the hour-by-hour plan can and cannot buy. All times are UTC.

| When | What happened | Source |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 20 Oct 2026, about 15:00 | The CVE IDs circulate on forums and social media with a wrong release time and a wrong CVSS rating. | [source](https://www.fastly.com/blog/how-fastly-detected-and-built-a-coordinated-response-to-php2shell) |
| 20 Oct 2026, 19:30 | PHP publishes a pre-announcement and moves the coordinated release forward a day to 21 Oct at 14:00. | [source](https://www.fastly.com/blog/how-fastly-detected-and-built-a-coordinated-response-to-php2shell) |
| 21 Oct 2026, 03:59 | The first request from a PHP2Shell-named tool appears in Fastly's telemetry. The most widespread exploit kit follows at 05:11. | [source](https://www.fastly.com/blog/how-fastly-detected-and-built-a-coordinated-response-to-php2shell) |
| 21 Oct 2026, 07:41 | Chainguard publishes images containing the fix, 6 hours 19 minutes before the 14:00 release. | [source](https://www.fastly.com/blog/how-fastly-detected-and-built-a-coordinated-response-to-php2shell) |
| 21 Oct 2026, 13:34 | GitHub publishes the PHP advisories for both CVEs. | [source](https://github.com/php/php-src/security/advisories/GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w) |
| 21 Oct 2026, 14:00 | PHP releases 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35. Fastly had seen more than 100 source IPs using PHP2Shell-named tools by then. NVD publishes the record at 14:17. | [source](https://www.fastly.com/blog/how-fastly-detected-and-built-a-coordinated-response-to-php2shell) |
| 21 Oct 2026 | CISA publishes an alert urging immediate patching of both CVEs, and names mod_php as the highest-risk server API. | [source](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/21/critical-vulnerabilities-php-require-immediate-patching) |
| 22 Oct 2026, midday | Fastly has stored about 250,000 requests from about 3,200 public IPs, roughly a third labeled as defensive checks. | [source](https://www.fastly.com/blog/how-fastly-detected-and-built-a-coordinated-response-to-php2shell) |
| 23 Oct 2026 | CISA updates the alert with a SIGMA detection rule and reinforced mitigation guidance. | [source](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/21/critical-vulnerabilities-php-require-immediate-patching) |
| 26 Oct 2026 | CISA adds both CVEs to KEV with a due date of 29 Oct 2026. | [source](https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-109618) |

Tools were scanning 9 hours and 35 minutes before the 13:34 advisory, so no plan beats the first requests, and Fastly says its counts cannot show which succeeded. What a plan buys is time relative to the other deadlines. Steps 1 to 4 need no fix. The pre-announcement at 19:30 on 20 Oct left 18 hours 30 minutes before the release for the SAPI inventory and the exposure order. From the advisory at 13:34, the 24-hour mark falls at 13:34 on 22 Oct, close to when Fastly's 250,000-request count was taken, and the 72-hour mark falls on 24 Oct, two days before the KEV entry and five days before its due date. A team that read only the CLI version, or restarted nothing after the package upgrade, would have carried the vulnerable worker through all of it.

## Related pages

- [The communications playbook for the first 72 hours](/playbooks/communications/)
- [The developer collaboration platform playbook for the first 72 hours](/playbooks/developer-collaboration-platform/)
- [The executive playbook for the first 72 hours](/playbooks/executive/)

## Sources

- PHP security advisory for CVE-2026-109618: https://github.com/php/php-src/security/advisories/GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w (read 19 Nov 2026)
- PHP security advisory for CVE-2026-109619: https://github.com/php/php-src/security/advisories/GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA alert on PHP vulnerabilities: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/21/critical-vulnerabilities-php-require-immediate-patching (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA KEV entry for CVE-2026-109618: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-109618 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA KEV entry for CVE-2026-109619: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-109619 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- Fastly report on PHP2Shell exploitation and timeline: https://www.fastly.com/blog/how-fastly-detected-and-built-a-coordinated-response-to-php2shell (read 19 Nov 2026)
- NVD record for CVE-2026-109618: https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-109618 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- NVD record for CVE-2026-109619: https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-109619 (read 19 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://zerodayplaybook.com/playbooks/application-runtime/
